

General Comment: The following checklist is for use in planning open houses/air shows while increased force protection conditions exist. Items listed are recommendations only and the installation wing commander must evaluate his/her installation security situation, local threat and abilities to meet these suggestions. Wing commanders are encouraged to use operational risk management, the wing force protection working group and other wing staff agencies in making their determinations.

## **Open House/Air Show Security Template**

<b>RECOMMENDATION</b>	<b>EFFECT</b>
1. PLANNING: Consider conducting a local vulnerability assessment within 3 months prior to an Open House and again within 30 days of the event. Use MAJCOM staffs to assist in planning and other available Air Force assets as necessary.	Proper planning will give the commander a true picture of equipment and personnel requirements to offset vulnerabilities.
1.1. Develop base plan at least 6 months prior to Open House – should be for official use only or classified as appropriate. Establish a continuity book to assist with future planning.	6-Month timeline is designed to allow for corrections if necessary. Due to vulnerabilities, protect plan appropriately.
1.1.1. Consider making Open House one day versus multiple days. If a 2-day Open House is necessary, consider using alternate gates each day to ensure security plans are not compromised.	One day will allow for public access, recruiting, etc., but won't overextend the base populace.
1.1.2. Use all assets available to assess on and off-installation topography (helicopter views or assessments).	The more vantage points used, the better an installation can identify vulnerabilities.
1.1.3. Consider use of off-base patrols in conjunction with civil authorities to mitigate vulnerabilities and surface-to-air missile footprint. Ensure JA is involved in jurisdictional issues and Posse Comitatus concerns. When the installation is bordered by a waterway, consider establishing an exclusionary zone. Coordinate with the USCG or local marine patrol as necessary.	Searches for vulnerabilities must be conducted inside and outside the installation. Use of civil authorities will give the installation a fresh view. Use OSI countersurveillance and CI operations.
1.1.4. Plan should follow current AF planning guidance and have all necessary annexes.	Consistency in planning is required.
1.1.5. Use Integrated Base Defense mission effect areas to ensure proper planning:	Allows AF to See First, Understand First and Act First.
1.1.5.1. Operations Security – Don't give your plan to the public (will obviously require publicity of open/close and major show times).	Gives an installation more options.
1.1.5.2. Deter – Ensure all personnel are working and in uniform to discourage enemies. Encourage military personnel attending the event to be in uniform.	Make consequences clear/Discourage the enemy.
1.1.5.3. Anticipate – Anticipate what the adversary may do to disrupt operations or create a mass casualty.	Proper plans can be developed and practiced before the event.
1.1.5.4. Deny – Deny access to portions of the installation not part of the Open House. Ensure all facilities are manned by personnel that are informed of their	Focuses force protection manpower on event site only; allowing for a concentrated effort. Personnel at offices allow for separate sets of

responsibilities, capable of sounding the alarm and alerting security personnel to suspicious personnel/actions.	eyes on other, non-open house assets.
1.1.5.5. Detect – See first all potential threats. Consider limiting large carry items (coolers/backpacks/handbags/etc). Vehicles should be as far away as possible and should be inspected if brought onto the installation (inspection can be done by canine searches at the parking location). Include biohazard capability. SV should ensure vendors do not gouge visitors because of their inability to bring items into the area. Water should always be available.	Maintains the event site as a safe and secure location. Checking for coolers/backpacks at the designated parking area allows visitor's to store items in their vehicles (a safe place away from the Open House). Purses/diaper bags/etc., will be brought into the area, so consideration to inspection stations at event areas is encouraged. Have PA advertise this fact using flyers, posters and media announcements.
1.1.5.6. Delay – Layer security.	Prevents adversary use of space and means of attack.
1.1.5.7. Assess – Analyze effect of your layered defense.	Leverages intelligence.
1.1.5.8. Deploy – Maintain capability to deploy with advantage to an incident. Ensure Disaster Control Group and emergency response forces are formed and in place to deploy to any situation. Installations with emergency services teams should use this capability and if not available, coordinate with local authorities to use their deployment team. Consider posting personnel on roof tops and facility upper floors (observers).	Pre-positioning of disaster response capabilities gives the installation instant response.
1.1.5.9. Neutralize – Emergency Service Teams or off-installation team should be in place and ready to neutralize any threat (Cooperation by civil authorities will be required if the installation has no EST in place). Recommend WG/JA coordination.	Renders the enemy ineffective if they do strike.
1.1.5.10. Mitigate – Have evacuation plans and notification systems in place to allow spectators an escape route way out from any emergency. Have emergency response (police/fire/medical) capabilities available for mass casualty response.	Minimize the effect of enemy successes. Take the advantage away from the enemy.
1.1.6. Force Protection Working Group (FPWG)	Don't plan in an SF only environment.
1.1.6.1. Meet regularly prior to the Open House and make recommendations to the Wing Commander concerning possible threats, adversary actions and actions for installation personnel for integrated base defense (develop security annex to base plan).	This group is the Wing Commander's tool to ensure for a safe and secure event.
1.1.6.1.1. Threat Working Group provide FPWG and Wing Commander with all intelligence data relevant to the installation and static display aircraft. NOTE: ANG installations will require dedicated active duty OSI support.	Continuous updates from local, state and federal law enforcement agencies are necessary for a successful event.
1.1.6.1.1.1. OSI should work closely with all local, state and federal agencies to ensure ground intelligence is presented to the group.	This action gives the installation intelligence as well as manpower to assist the wing.
1.1.6.2. FPWG makes recommendations for manning assistance to ensure Open House is secure and safe.	Keeps Wing Commander apprised of requirements.
1.1.6.2.1. All active duty military personnel and base civilian employees should be considered as part of the security and safety team—personnel should be directed to work in accordance with WG/CC desires.	This is a force-multiplier. All active duty base personnel should be on duty and used for reporting purposes. Civilians will be used at the WG/CC discretion.
1.1.6.2.2. Consider manning assist from sister services,	Brings personnel assets in TDY, if necessary.

tenant organizations, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, Civil Air Patrol and civil police, fire and medical personnel. NOTE: ANG bases consider manning assistance from active duty and Army National Guard units.	For those installations providing aircraft displays, coordinate with the respective home station security forces unit to provide personnel for aircraft security, if necessary.
1.1.6.3. Consider installation entry control and exit procedures.	Essential for VIP, Emergency and mass entry/exit from the installation.
1.1.6.3.1. During Open Houses, consider not opening the entire installation--channel non-base personnel to secure area for festivities (AAFES/Commissary/Post Office/Etc add to traffic problems//Weddings/Club events/large parties should be rescheduled for alternate dates). This will require base personnel at every possible roadway or trail to ensure base guests stay within the channel area and do not deviate from the assigned travel route. Chase vehicles may be required at key installation locations.	Maintains control of visitors and only allows them access to the areas of the installation intended by the Open House. Does not allow visitors to disrupt normal day-to-day functions/housing/etc.
1.1.6.3.1.1. Parking should be directed by base personnel. If vehicles are channeled into the parking area, personnel should be required to park sequentially. Vendors may require vehicle access to ramps for booth set-up. Plan on conducting security inspections for these vehicles and personnel.	Will ensure all spaces are used and will allow more vehicle parking spaces. NOTE: Handicapped parking capabilities must be considered. NOTE: This will not necessarily keep personnel within the Air Show area, but will keep their vehicles there. Patrol of non-air show areas must be alert for "stray visitors" at all times.
1.1.6.3.2. Consider off-base parking and/or isolated area away from air show area for bussing of spectators -- ensure security check is made prior to bus boarding to ensure safety of buses and allow spectators to place items not allowed at the air show in their vehicles. Buses should run continuously through a special gate just for buses during entire Air Show for convenience of visitors. Funding of bus transportation will be the requirement of the wing.	Off base or isolated parking minimizes installation exposure to possible explosive devices. Transportation of handicapped guests must be considered. Wing PA must advertise parking requirements.
1.1.6.3.2.1. If magnetometers or "wands" are available, personnel should be channeled through them prior to loading buses.	Ensure metal weapons (guns/knives/etc) will not be introduced to the event area. Wing PA must notify public of requirements.
1.1.6.3.2.2. Military personnel should be on each bus as a host and security check. Report suspicious personnel/ activity. Communications should be available to the military host for emergencies.	These hosts act as your first line of defense in spotting suspicious persons and can sound the alarm, if required.
1.1.6.3.2.3. If off-base parking is used, only vehicles normally allowed access to the installation, as well as vendors, should be allowed through the normal installation entry control points. Rehearse plan to derive vulnerabilities.	Access to the installation is still required for base housing occupants, installation workers and event sponsors.
1.1.6.3.2.3.1. Open House parking would still be required for authorized base populace.	A parking area on base must be available for authorized base personnel – precludes having them drive off base for mass-transit back onto the installation.
1.1.6.3.2.3.1.1. Screening of personnel will still be necessary between the parking area and Open House (use of magnetometers, wands, etc as required).	Wherever parking is available, screening must be completed to ensure for everyone's safety.
1.1.6.3.2.3.1.2. Personnel parking on base and/or, most importantly, entering ramp area, should have same restrictions for backpacks, coolers, etc.	Required to maintain security of event.

1.1.6.3.3. Consider Aircraft Displays and Show.	
1.1.6.3.3.1. Static Displays—Enforce deadlines for response to invitations to participate.	See AFI 11-209 for additional guidance.
1.1.6.3.3.1.1. Parking plan.	Parking plan is very important to security requirements.
1.1.6.3.3.1.2. Fuel -- Should aircraft not be fueled while on display?	Consider not refueling aircraft until after the event to minimize amount of fuel on the ramp in case of mass casualty/keep in mind that some aircraft require fuel while parked. Also, look at the explosive situation based on empty fuel vapors versus full fuel tanks.
1.1.6.3.3.1.3. Aircraft Security (AFJI 31-102, Physical Security, and AFI 31-101, Air Force Installation Security Program, are references available.	Outlines aircraft security requirements.
1.1.6.3.3.1.3.1. Are ropes and stanchions required?	Some aircraft will require ropes and stanchions. Ensure the installation has enough on hand.
1.1.6.3.3.1.3.2. Aircraft commander should assume security of static aircraft during the Air Show/Open House. Uniformed presence is required by a knowledgeable person to answer questions for public.	Prior to aircraft arrival, aircraft commanders must be informed of the requirement for them to protect their aircraft during the event.
1.1.6.3.3.1.3.2.1. Which aircraft require armed Air Force security?	Some aircraft require armed security. Security requirements should be known prior to the event.
1.1.6.3.3.1.3.2.2. Consider limiting public access to some or all static displays.	Maintains the interior security of the aircraft and minimizes potential threats/Refer to AFI 11-209 for guidance.
1.1.6.3.3.1.3.3. Consider spacing between aircraft for crowd control purposes.	Allows for emergency vehicle access.
1.1.6.3.3.2. Air Show—Consider airspace restrictions to commercial and private aircraft and media.	Maintains security of airspace.
1.1.6.3.3.2.1. Ensure Air Boss, airfield operations personnel and Force Protection Working Group are brought into the planning stages early.	Air Boss coordinates all aircraft requirements. FPWG coordinates all security requirements.
1.1.6.3.3.2.1.1. Coordinate off-installation air space to ensure security.	Completed by either the Air Boss or base operations personnel on behalf of the Air Boss.
1.1.6.3.3.2.1.2. Provide FPWG with names of Air Show participants and vendors to ensure proper security screening.	Allows for checks of personnel for disbarment or other requirements.
1.1.6.3.3.3. Vendors should be identified and properly screened/inspections completed. If vendors require workers, consider spouses for fundraising versus military personnel to ensure military are available for force protection duties. Vendor arrival times should be coordinated to ensure security personnel are available for security checks.	Allows for checks of personnel for disbarment or other requirements. Allows military personnel for force protection requirements.
1.1.6.3.3.3.1. Plan for large commercial/vendor vehicle search area.	Channels trucks to one central location for inspection purposes.
1.1.6.3.3.4. OSI should be used to monitor crowd and report suspicious personnel/activities to uniformed security forces personnel.	OSI is a non-uniformed law enforcement agency specially trained in surveillance.
1.1.6.3.3.5. Security Forces Emergency Services Team (if one is available) or civilian police equivalent should be assembled and ready to respond.	Capability may be required at a moment's notice.

1.1.6.3.3.6. Disaster Control Group should be assembled and on duty.	Capability may be required at a moment's notice.
1.1.6.3.3.7. EOD should be assembled and ready to respond. Installations without EOD capabilities should coordinate with the nearest EOD unit for support.	Capability may be required at a moment's notice.
1.1.6.3.3.8. Medical personnel and emergency services should be available to triage and handle mass casualties. Units without medical support should coordinate with local authorities for support.	Capability may be required at a moment's notice.
1.1.6.3.3.9. Riot control requirements should be considered.	Although not normally a problem at an Open House, this contingency should be considered.
1.1.6.3.3.10. Consider posting spotters and marksmen as appropriate and if available. Spotters can be backed up with cameras/recorders and should report suspicious personnel/activities to uniformed security personnel using available communications. Use high vantage points for spotters. Image to the public should always be considered.	Gives the force protection force the See First, Understand First, Act First capability.
1.1.6.3.3.11. Consider establishment of an apprehension/detainment area and have teams identified, equipped and readily available to perform such duties, when necessary.	Preplanning for detention will pay dividends in the case where apprehensions are required.
1.1.6.3.4. Dignitary Support.	All such events will have dignitaries present.
1.1.6.3.4.1. Establish a separate area for dignitaries for viewing the Air Show. Use an entry control point for restricted VIP access. Areas should be separated to allow the capability to detect unauthorized personnel.	Ensures for VIP protection. Have escorts, evacuation plans and notification procedures in place to allow VIPs an escape route away from the emergency.
1.1.6.3.4.2. Plan travel routes to and from Open House for security and expediting VIPs.	Ensures for security/safety of VIPs while traversing the installation.
1.1.6.3.4.3. Have sufficient security on hand for VIP protection (visible uniformed armed individuals are recommended).	Uniformed, armed individuals deter attacks.
1.1.6.3.4.4. Consider establishing a "safe place" for evacuation of VIPs should it become necessary.	A safe place for dignitaries should be established and the VIPs informed of that location should they need it. Preplanning transportation is also a must.
1.1.7. Consider a MASS Casualty/WMD exercise with local civilian participation in advance of the Open House.	Solidifies the base/community interaction in case it is needed in time of crisis.
1.2. In coordination with the WG/JA, SF should plan for the disposition of dissidents and/or protestors.	Establish that protected First Amendment speech does not extend to expressions that present a clear danger to loyalty, discipline and morale of service members or interfere with mission accomplishment.
1.2.1. SF should escort offenders to a holding area or turn them over to civil authorities and bar offenders from re-entry.	Remove the sources of illegal activity.
1.2.2. Recommend competent civilian law enforcement (depending on jurisdiction at the installation) be postured to rapidly process offenders, including those who might violate a debarment order.	Punish the sources of illegal activity.
1.3. Consider having water stations with cups available throughout the display areas, parking lots and areas where visitors will be required to walk long distances.	Ensures visitors have the ability to stay hydrated.
1.4. Consider placing bicycle racks near entrances to ramp to allow visitors the capability to lock the bicycles and keep the bicycles off the display area.	Ensures visitors have a place to lock their bicycles and keeps them off of the ramp.

2. EXECUTION:	
2.1. Practice plan prior to Open House.	Practice of plan ensures plan will work.
2.1.1. Ensure evacuation plan will work and perform walk-through exercises.	Ensures personnel are moved to safe areas in a timely manner.
2.2. Security – All base personnel should be part of the integrated base security team. They should be briefed in mass on what to look for and how to report suspicious personnel/incidents. Brief current local and country threat, as appropriate.	Use all manpower assets as part of the force protection capability. Ensuring they know what to look for and what the threat is ensures for their safety and the safety and security of others.
2.2.1. Communications should be available as necessary and personnel should be linked to ensure proper security reporting is accomplished (secure if possible). COMSEC is important since unsecure radios can be monitored.	Communication in time of emergency is essential. Proper communication can ensure a potential threat is neutralized prior to it effecting the Open House.
2.2.1.1. Civil authorities, OSI, SF, etc., should be able to talk to each other directly or through a command communications center to ensure all personnel have appropriate data.	Linking all law enforcement efforts is essential. If common radio channels are not available, a communications center will be required so all efforts are channeled to one location/also consider cell phone use.
2.2.1.2. WG/PA should consider coordinating with local media to request public compliance with security requirements, i.e. leaving backpacks, coolers, etc in their vehicles.	Ensures personnel don't arrive at the entry points with these items and prevents them from having to return to their vehicles.
2.2.2. Consider Open House a normal workday for all military personnel—all wear uniforms (exception: AFOSI and/or local police under cover personnel assigned to mingle with the spectators). SF investigators are part of the uniformed force; however, units should employ them either as uniformed or non-uniformed personnel. Consider using civil police on the ramp as well.	Again, a force-multiplier. The more uniformed personnel at the event, the less likely a potential threat will be carried out.
2.2.3. Consider posting traffic control measures prior to public entry (some people will show up extra early in hopes of gaining access to the installation).	If one vehicle/person gets passed the installation security, the event is in jeopardy and lives could be at stake.
2.2.4. Ensure post relief/meal breaks are given to posted personnel at regular intervals as necessary.	Required to ensure alertness of force protection force.
2.2.5. Ensure proper supervisory staff are in place for the numbers of personnel posted for Open House requirements.	Designed to ensure proper security is maintained and personnel needs are taken care of.
2.2.6. VIP security and escorts should be available as scheduled.	VIPs are sometimes early.
2.2.6.1. Identify safe areas for VIPs.	Safety is paramount.
3. AFTER-ACTIONS:	
3.1. Ensure aircraft receive proper security until they are airborne.	Aircraft security requirements change at the end of an event. Aircraft security reverts to security forces at the end of the event.
3.2. Consider screening clean-up personnel prior to access to the installation.	Again, ensuring for the protections of Air Force assets/personnel.
3.3. Complete an after-actions report and continuity book on Open House actions and security lessons learned report in accordance with AFI 31-201, Security Police Practices and Procedures (name changing to Security Forces Practices and Procedures).	Assists others in their planning process.

Recommended Open House Tool Kit and Costs

<b>Technology</b>	<b>Application</b>	<b>Est Cost</b>	<b>Source</b>	<b>Support</b>	<b>Comments</b>
<b>Walk-through magneto-meters</b>	Lightweight & portable metal detection & warning	\$4.8K each times five per kit for a total of \$24K per kit.	Metorex Security Products; Garrett Metal detectors	Requires 115VAC power source at inspection site	Easy set up and operation, a minimum of 5 should be considered
<b>Portable X-ray screener</b>	Lightweight, table-top configuration	\$16.5K each per kit.	Heimann Systems	Requires 115 VAC power source at inspection site	
<b>X-Ray Reference Manual</b>	Tutor X-ray screening operators	\$0.45K each times one per kit	Secure Research Inc.	N/A	3-ring binder \$450 4-part video \$480
<b>Garrett Container</b>	Protect/transport Tool kit	\$6.5 –7K each times one per kit	Garrett	N/A	
<b>Hand-held Metal Detectors</b>	Lightweight, portable metal detection	\$200-285 each times ten per kit for a total of \$2,850.00.	Garrett; Metorex; Sibel Ltd.	Battery operated	Should be packaged in quantities of 10



**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE**  
**HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE**  
**WASHINGTON, DC**

**APR 15 2002**

**MEMORANDUM FOR MAJCOM/CVs**

**FROM: HQ USAF/XO**  
1630 Air Force Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20330-1630

**SUBJECT: Air Shows/Open Houses**

Reference the CSAF Message, Thunderbirds Participation at Open Houses and Air Shows, DTG 041750ZJAN02. This year's Air Shows/Open Houses will take on an unprecedented significance to our military members and our civilian communities. While the security of our installations remains a top priority of our continuing force protection efforts, we should not give the appearance of hiding within the fortifications of our bases. It is important that we continue to demonstrate our aerospace power to support the recruiting and the public affairs missions. As a part of our on going efforts to balance force protection requirements, we have developed the attached Open House checklist. This checklist is not all-inclusive, but is a tool for your installation commanders to use as a guide to help make our Air Shows/Open Houses successful. MAJCOM Commanders will make the determination as to whether or not they will permit their bases to host Air Shows/Open Houses. The installation commander is ultimately responsible for the safety of his people and resources and "has the hammer" in conducting a thorough threat assessment. Upon completion of the threat assessment, the installation commander will provide a recommendation back to the MAJCOM Commander on whether to approve/disapprove an Air Show/Open House.

Your attention to this process will ensure we can enjoy a successful Open House/Air Show season while ensuring the protection of our people and our resources.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Charles F. Wald".

**CHARLES F. WALD, Lt Gen, USAF**  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
Air and Space Operations

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Open House Checklist